Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower by Graham, Kenneth
Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower
Kenneth Graham*
Writers and judges have called the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment in Crawford v. Washington many
things.' But the movie version should be called Sir Walter Raleigh Came Over on
the Mayflower and Other Stories My Evidence Teacher Taught Me.2 Justice
Scalia's majority opinion tells a version of the history of the Confrontation Clause
that would do Hollywood proud. But unless they wish to operate on the same level
of "truth" as "reality TV," lawyers should know better.
The conventional history of the right of confrontation, as embraced by the
Crawford majority, goes something like this:3 the right of confrontation was
created by common law judges seeking to preserve the English tradition of liberty
in cases of the Tudor oppression of the aristocracy; our ancestors brought this
common law right with them when they came to the New World and deployed it
against imperial persecution in inquisitorial courts. When drafting the Bill of
Rights, James Madison wrote this common law right to cross-examine witnesses
into the Sixth Amendment as a separate right of "confrontation."
Unfortunately, this romantic myth conflicts with some little-known facts-
notably that the English common law has never recognized a right of
confrontation.4
Why should we care whether the Supreme Court uses spurious history to
justify its decisions? First, some writers and courts actually use the Supreme
Court's history to decide what powers the right of confrontation gives criminal
defendants. 5 While we can debate whether courts should use history this way,
presumably few would defend the misuse of history to deny defendants their
rights. Second, the right of confrontation's true history supports some parts of the
Professor Emeritus, U.C.L.A. School of Law.
See 30A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 6371.2 (Pocket Pt. 2005). Readers seeking documentation may find it by
logging on to Westlaw, entering "FPP" and the relevant section number in "Find," then clicking "go."
2 Id. The Court apparently got its CliffsNotes version of history from a brief filed by a group
of law professors. Motion for Leave to File and Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors Sherman J.
Clark et al., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754958.
3 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44-49 (2004).
4 ANDREW L.T. CHOO, HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 181(1996).
5 See, e.g., Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 951-52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting
confrontation claim because police interrogation was dissimilar to "an inquiry before King James I's
Privy Council"). Cf Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 558 (2005) (comparing police interrogation to
preliminary hearing before English Justice of the Peace).
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Crawford opinion and undermines other parts. Third, the true story provides a far
more complex and interesting tale than the conventional "history" embraced by the
Crawford majority, albeit a tale that cannot provide an answer to all contemporary
Confrontation Clause questions.
But first, a bit of background to refresh the reader's recollection. True
history, as we shall see, suggests that the Founders viewed the Sixth Amendment
holistically; that is, they saw the enumerated rights as dots that had to be connected
to provide a right to an adversary system of criminal justice that was much more
than the sum of the specified parts. For example, the Founders said nothing about
"trial by newspaper," but viewed holistically the Sixth Amendment incorporates
"the blank pad rule" that requires courts to make sure that criminal convictions rest
only on evidence produced in open court.
6
The Supreme Court did not construe the Confrontation Clause until very late
in the Nineteenth Century.7 Ignorant of the true history, the Supreme Court's
confrontation jurisprudence prior to 1965 tended to see confrontation as a narrow
right to cross-examine available witnesses. So long as the issue only arose in
federal cases, the Court seldom had to confront a major problem with this analysis;
namely, the connection, if any, between the right of confrontation and the common
law hearsay rule, which was also rationalized as resting on a need for cross-
examination.8 But when the Court made the federal right of confrontation binding
on the states by "incorporating" it into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 9 it loosed the demons of Hell. For the next quarter of a century, the
Court struggled to avoid "fusion"-that is, making confrontation simply a
constitutional version of the hearsay rule. Finally in 1980 in Ohio v. Roberts, the
Court hit on a kind of fusion it thought states could live with.'0
After another quarter of a century tweaking Roberts, some members of the
Court became unhappy with fusion and expressed interest in rethinking the Court's
confrontation jurisprudence." In Crawford, those judges attempted such a fresh
start. Basically, Crawford suggests a dual system of confrontation. One class of
hearsay that the Court calls "testimonial statements" fall under a fairly severe
regime-inadmissible unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a
6 For an example of such a holistic reading, see Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472
(1965).
7 30A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 6356, at 212 (2000).
8 Readers familiar with the Court's recent decisions know that the Court tried to root both
rules in a more fundamental concern about the "reliability" of the evidence used to convict. History
provides little support for this reading and Crawford seems to reject it-but that question lies beyond
the scope of this essay.
9 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
'0 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). Without going into doctrinal niceties, suffice it to say that the
Court held that well-established hearsay exceptions were presumptively constitutional. Other hearsay
from available declarants had to possess some "indicia of reliability" to pass constitutional muster.
n WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 6370, at 862-63.
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prior chance to cross-examine the declarant. All other hearsay statements remain
subject to the Roberts fusion regime. 12
This essay argues that history lends some support to the Crawford dual
system of confrontation; in 1164, long before the hearsay rule emerged, the
Constitutions of Clarendon drew what would prove to be a recurrent distinction
between hearsay declarants when it provided that "[l]aymen are not to be accused
save by proper and legal accusers and witnesses in the presence of the bishop.'
' 3
But, on the other hand, history undermines the Court's long-standing view that
confrontation requires only cross-examination. Instead, history suggests that
confrontation comprises one small part of the "holistic Sixth Amendment" that the
Founders called "trial by jury."'14
I. "FOREIGN" ANTECEDENTS
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court refers to European and colonial history
in support of its conclusions. Given Justice Scalia's criticism of other members of
the Court for relying on "foreign precedents,"' 15 his use of English antecedents in
his Crawford opinion seems surprising. Moreover, anachronism plagues his claim
that confrontation "dates back to Roman times." While Roman law did recognize
a procedure bearing that name, it was not a trial device but an investigative tool
resembling a modem police lineup. 16 The majority opinion may similarly mislead
when it cites Blackstone to support the claim that "the common law" was the
Founders' "immediate source" for the Sixth Amendment right. 17  Blackstone
supports the holistic right recognized by the Founders, not the crabbed right of
cross-examination embraced in the Court's modem decisions.
The Scalia opinion rests on sounder ground when it claims that the colonists
carried with them to the New World a resentment of the English use of Roman law
procedures. But Scalia, perhaps understandably, overlooks a more potent user of
the inquisitorial system-the church courts. 18 Under the so-called "inquisitio" the
ecclesiastical judge combined the roles of accuser, prosecutor, judge, witness, and
jury. While ordinary folk may have cared little and known less about aristocratic
treason trials, they were quite familiar with the church courts that prosecuted sin
12 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 6371.2.
13 30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 6342, at 210-11 (2000) (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 45 (1969) (emphasis added)).
14 Id. § 6348, at 780.
15 Anne Gearan, Foreign Rulings Not Relevant to High Court, Scalia Says, WASH. POST, Apr.
3, 2003, at A7.
16 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 6342, at 199.
17 The influence of Blackstone is described in WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 6345, at
528-29.
"8 See id § 6342, at 200.
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and heresy. When the Sacrament Act of 1547 gave Justices of the Peace power to
enforce sumptuary laws, the statute enjoined them to "examine the accusers...
and other witnesses" to determine "how many other than the accusers have
knowledge" of the crime.' 9 The majority opinion correctly notes that many victims
of these inquisitorial proceedings demanded to face their "accusers," but it
erroneously supposes that "accuser" meant any "witness against" the prisoner,
ignorant of the historical distinction between the "accuser" and ordinary
"witnesses."
In 1652, Gerard Winstanley, a leading figure among a group of communist
Christians popularly known as "the Levellers," proposed a list of sixty-two laws
for a Christian Commonwealth that included two adjacent provisions that illustrate
the distinction. The first provided that "[n]o accusation shall be taken against any
man, unless it be proved by two or three witnesses." The second added that "[t]he
accuser and accused shall always appear face to face before any Officer, that both
sides may be heard." Later Winstanley defines "accusation" as "when one man
complains of another to an Officer; all other accusations the Law takes no notice
of.
20
In a portion of his trial not quoted in the Crawford opinion, Raleigh also
distinguishes between accusers and witnesses:
For all that is said to the contrary, you see my only accuser is the
Lord Cobham, who, with tears, hath lamented his false accusing me, and
repented of it as if it had been an horrible murder ... [after quoting St.
Augustine on judging others as you would be judged, Raleigh continues]
if you would be content all this should befall you upon a trial by
suspicions and presumptions,-upon an accusation not subscribed by
your accuser,-without the open testimony of a single witness, then so
judge me as you would yourselves be judged.2 '
The Crawford opinion quotes Raleigh's demand for confrontation with his
accuser without noting that he insists on trial by jury, rather than being tried by the
procedures of "the Spanish Inquisition., 22 In other words, he wants more than
cross-examination.
John Lilburne, a defendant more likely to be known to those who would go to
America, was an accomplished self-publicist who managed to fall afoul of both
monarchist and Puritan rulers.23 When brought before Star Chamber he demanded
confrontation with his accusers but linked it to the nascent privilege against self-
19 Id. § 6342, at 226 (citing Sacrament Act, 1547, 1 Edw. 7, c. 1, § 2 (emphasis added)).
20 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 6343, at 309 (citing GERARD WINSTANLEY, THE LAW
OF FREEDOM IN A PLATFORM 138 (Kenny ed. 1973)).
21 Id. § 6342, at 268 (citing JARDINE, I HISTORICAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 441-42, 449 (1832)).
22 Id. § 6342, at 262-63.
23 Id. §6343, at311-17.
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incrimination and a right to a public trial: "produce them in the face of the open
court, that we may see what they accuse me of; and I am ready here to answer for
myself., 24  Later, while standing in the pillory after having been whipped a
hundred strokes, Lilburne harangued the crowd about the injustice of his trial but
appealed to a higher authority than the common law:
[I]t is absolutely against the law of God; for that law requires no man to
accuse himself; but if any thing be laid to his charge, there must come
two or three witnesses at least to prove it. It is also against the practice
of Christ himself, who, in all his examinations before the high priest,
would not accuse himself, but upon their demands, returned this answer,
"Why ask you me? Go to them that heard me."
25
In a later pamphlet account of his trial, Lilbume again linked confrontation
with self-incrimination, but more modestly compared himself to Paul before the
Roman Governor.26
Confrontation also appears in popular culture of the time. For example,
Shakespeare has several references to confrontation; the best known lines come
from the opening scene of Richard II where the King, after satisfying himself that
the accusation against the Duke of Norfolk was made in good faith, orders "[t]hen
call them to our presence; face to face, [a]nd frowning brow to brow, ourselves
will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak., 27 Other passages of aristocratic
confrontation appear in another historical play.2 8 But the passage most likely to
appeal to the groundlings occurs in a parody preliminary examination in the
comedy Much Ado About Nothing. As Dogberry, the blundering constable deputed
to run the hearing, tries to browbeat a confession out of the accused, the sexton
corrects him with "[m]aster constable, you go not the way to examine: you must
call forth the watch that are their accusers. 2 9
II. CONFRONTATION IN AMERICA
Though the colonists did not carry over any common law right of
confrontation to the New World, they did carry with them two books that played a
key role in the creation of that right on this side of the Atlantic. The most popular
24 John Lilbum, The Trial of John Lilburn and John Wharton (1637), in 3 COBBETT'S
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH CRIMES AND OTHER CRIMES
AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT (1809).
25 Id. at 1332.
26 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 6342, at 24 1.
27 Id. § 6342, at 255 (citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD THE SECOND, act 1, sc. 1).
21 Id. § 6342, at 255-57.
29 Id. § 6342, at 257-58 (citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING, act 4,
sc. 2).
2005] 213
214 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LA W [Vol 3:209
book in colonial homes was the Geneva Bible, published as its name suggests by
exiles from the Marian persecutions. 30 The Geneva Bible carried marginal notes
that, among other things, tried to show the contemporary political significance of
Biblical passages. King James so feared the Geneva Bible that he ordered
preparation of the "authorized version" of the Bible that later bore his name-but
bore no marginal notes of political commentary.
In the best known Biblical passage on confrontation, Paul stood accused of
sedition so a Roman tribune sent him to the Roman governor and "commanded his
accusers to speak before thee [the governor] the things they had against him." At
the hearing, Paul challenged his accusers who had only hearsay knowledge to
prove the charges, pointing out that witnesses who had personal knowledge "ought
to have been present before thee, and accuse me, if they had ought against me." At
this point, a marginal note underlines the dangers of hearsay: "For his accusers
spake but upon a false report, which these bellowers of Satan had blowen abroad,
and durst not them selves appear." Two years later when Festus became governor
he wrote his superior that Paul's enemies were still demanding his punishment,
adding "[t]o whom I answered, that it is not the maner of the Romaines for favor
to deliver anie man to the death before that he which is accused, have the accusers
before him, and have place to defend himself, concerning the crime.,
3 1
Though Festus may refer to the Roman form of confrontation, the translator
blurs the distinction so as to favor a broader reading by dissenters. For example,
John Lilbume used this passage expansively to condemn Star Chamber for treating
,,32him worse than the "Pagans and Heathen Romans.
Confrontation also figures in the noncanonical tale of Jesus and the
anonymous woman allegedly caught in an act of adultery. When his enemies
brought her before Jesus to force him to choose between his teachings and the
Mosaic law, Jesus famously replied, "Let him that is among you without sinne,
cast the first stone at her." The Geneva Bible explains that in casting the first
stones, witnesses "declared that they testified trueth." So challenged, her accusers
slunk off one by one, leaving Jesus alone with the woman. The Geneva Bible
continues: "When Jesus had lift up him self againe, and sawe no man, but the
woman, he said unto her, Woman, where are those thine accusers? Hathe no man
condemned thee? She said, No man, Lord. And Jesus said, Nether do I condemne
thee: go and sinne no more."
33
30 Id. § 6342, at 234-36.
3' Id. § 6342, at 238-40 (citing Acts 25:16).
32 See id. § 6342, at 240-41 (citing JOHN LILBURNE, A WORKE OF THE BEAST, OR A RELATION
OF A MOST UNCHRISTIAN CENSURE (1638) (reprinted in WILLIAM HALLER, 2 TRACTS ON LIBERTY IN
THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 1638-1647, at 9 (William Haller ed. 1934) (1885))).
33 Id. § 6342, at 242 (citing John 8:9).
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A manual for justices of the peace popular in the colonies cites this passage
for the ironic proposition that "no man is to be condemned [sic] without an
accuser."
34
The second book of confrontation stories that the colonists carried to the New
World was Fox's Book of Martyrs-a compendium of religious persecution in
England and elsewhere.35 Foxe decried the Spanish Inquisition because:
[W]hat is done in the process no person knoweth, but only the holy
fathers and the tormentors, which are sworn to execute the torments. All
is done in secret ... for all the proceedings of that execrable inquisition
are open to no man, but all is done in hugger-mugger and close corners,
by ambages, by covert ways, and secret counsels. The accuser is secret,
the crime secret, the witness secret, whatsoever is done is secret, and
neither is the poor prisoner ever advertised of any thing. If he can guess
who accused him, whereof and wherefore, he may be pardoned
peradventure of his life: but this is very seldom ....36
The distinction between "accusers" and "witnesses" runs throughout Foxe's
volumes-the former often equated with "informers" or hearsay declarants. For
example, in 1415 John Hus challenged his accusers:
[S]ince that you, which do never cease to slander and backbite me with
your words, do understand and know these things, come forth openly
before the face and presence of the lord archbishop, and with an open
mouth declare and show forth what false doctrine or other things ye have
heard me teach, contrary to the catholic faith.37
According to Foxe, long before Sir Walter Raleigh ordinary English men and
women were demanding production of an accuser, eventually linking this to the
inchoate privilege against self-incrimination.
Since they could not invoke the common law, the dissenters fell back on the
Bible. For example, in 1530 they wrote a letter to one of their "brethren" in the
Tower, warning him against informers and adding that:
[W]e must not suffer the wrong, but boldly reprove them that sit as
righteous judges, and do contrary to righteousness. Therefore, according
both to God's law and man's, ye be not bound to make answer in any
14 Id. § 6370, at 242 (citing MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 379 (1746)).
31 See id. § 6342, at 248, 258.
36 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 1, § 6342.1 (citing JOHN FOXE, 2 Fox's BOOK OF
MARTYRS: THE ACTS AND MONUMENTS OF THE CHURCH 174-75 (Cumming ed. 1851)).
31 Id. § 6342.1 (citing JOHN FOXE, 1 Fox's BOOK OF MARTYRS: THE ACTS AND MONUMENTS OF
THE CHURCH 839 (Cumming ed. 1851)).
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cause, till your accusers come before you; which if you require, and
thereon do stick, the false brethren shall be known, to the great comfort
of those that now stand in doubt whom they may trust; and it shall also
be a mean that they shall not craftily, by questions, take you in snares.
And that you may do this lawfully, in Acts xx. it is written, It is not the
manner of the Romans to deliver any man that he should perish, before
that he which is accused have his accusers before him, and have licence
to answer for himself, as pertaining to the crime whereof he is accused.38
The martyrs quoted by Foxe drew on a broad range of procedural and
substantive policies ranging from religious freedom to separation of functions-
one dissenter even claimed that without an accuser distinct from those who would
judge the accusation "there is no due form of process in the judgment. ' 39
III. THE REVOLUTIONARY IMPETUS
What the colonists brought with them, then, was not an English right of
confrontation, but the English and Continental intellectual seeds that would
blossom into the right of confrontation when fertilized by inquisitorial abuses in
the colonies. Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Crawford correctly notes the
revolutionary roots of the Sixth Amendment but his focus on the narrow cross-
examination model of "confrontation" does not do justice to the impact of the
inquisitorial vice-admiralty courts.4°  John Adams, who later drafted the
Massachusetts confrontation clause, defended John Hancock in vice-admiralty
court on a charge of smuggling and when the prosecution invoked common law
evidence rules, Adams argued to the court:
[T]hat if We are to be governed by the Rules of the common law We
ought to adopt it as a whole and summon a jury and be tryed by Magna
Charta. Every Examination of Witnesses ought to be in open Court, in
Presence of the Parties, Face to Face.41
George Mason, who would draft the Virginia confrontation clause, also
thought trial by jury captured a bundle of rights denied in vice-admiralty courts. In
a letter to a group of English merchants explaining why repeal of the Stamp Act
did not suffice to resolve colonial grievances, Mason wrote:
3 Id. § 6342.1 (citing JOHN FOXE, 1 Fox's BOOK OF MARTYRS: THE ACTS AND MONUMENTS
OF THE CHURCH 350-51 (Cumming ed. 185 1)).
" Id. § 6342.1 (citing JOHN FOXE, I Fox's BOOK OF MARTYRS: THE ACTS AND MONUMENTS OF
THE CHURCH 206 (Cumming ed. 1851)).
40 See WRIGHTr& GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 6345, at 484-85.
41 Id. § 6345, at 521-22 (citing JOHN L. ADAMS, 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 185 (L.
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., Belknap Press 1965)).
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To make an odious distinction between us and our fellow-subjects
residing in Great Britain, by depriving us of the ancient trial, by a jury of
our equals, and substituting in its place an arbitrary civil-law court-to
put it in the power of every sycophant and informer ("the most
mischievous, wicked, abandoned and profligate race," says an eminent
writer upon British politics, "that ever God permitted to plague
mankind") to drag a freeman a thousand miles from his own country
(whereby he may be deprived of the benefit of evidence) to defend his
property before a judge, who, from the nature of his office, is a creature
of the ministry, liable to be displaced at their pleasure, whose interest it
is to encourage informers, as his income may in great measure depend
upon his condemnations, and to give such judge a power of excluding the
most innocent man thus treated, from any remedy (even the recovery of
his costs) by only certifying that in his opinion there was a probable
cause of complaint ... [are evils that] did not altogether depend upon the
stamp act, and therefore are not repealed with it.
42
Ordinary citizens got regular reports of the proceedings against Hancock in
the revolutionary periodical, A Journal of The Times, which compared the vice-
admiralty courts unfavorably with Star Chamber.43 Similarly, when Henry
Laurens of South Carolina, who would later serve as President of the Continental
Congress, became embroiled in a vice-admiralty proceeding, he wrote a widely
circulated pamphlet attacking those courts in which he used Blackstone's famous
encomium on trial by jury to attack the vice-admiralty denial of confrontation. 44
But colonial grievances extended well beyond vice-admiralty courts and
inquisitorial proceedings. When Pennsylvania tried to move the trial of a group of
backwoodsmen, who had slaughtered a group of Conestogas, from the frontier to
Philadelphia, a petition against this procedure argued it would
deprive British Subjects of their known Privileges . . . and to contradict
the well-known Laws of the British Nation in a point whereon Life,
Liberty and security essentially depend, namely, that of being tried by
their equals in the neighborhood where their own, their Accusers' and the
Witnesses' Character and Credit with the Circumstances of the Fact, are
best known.45
42 Id. § 6345, at 503-04 (citing EDMUND SEARS MORGAN, PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION 159-60
(Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1973) (1959)).
41 Id. § 6345, at 524-25 (citing 0. M. DICKERSON, BOSTON UNDER MILITARY RULE 31
(1979)).
44 Id. § 6345, at 515-16 (citing A Remonstrance of the Distressed and Bleeding Frontier
Inhabitants of the Province of Pennsylvania (1764), in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 50
(Henry Steele Commager ed., 1968)).
41 Id. § 6345, at 492.
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Notice that this passage distinguishes between "accusers" and "witnesses"
and links trial by jury to what would become the vicinage clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Similarly, a pamphlet attacking a New York statute declaring Ethan
Allan and the Green Mountain Boys guilty of riot closed with this bit of doggerel:
When Caesar reigned King at Rome
Saint Paul was sent to hear his doom,
But Roman Law in a criminal Case,
Must have the Accuser Face to Face,
Or Caesar gives a flat Denial-
But here's a Law made now of late,
Which destines Men to awful Fate
And Hangs and Damns without a Trial ....
In other words, failure to confront means more than denial of cross-
examination-it means a denial of trial by jury.
On the eve of the Revolution, the colonists began invoking Blackstone's
recently published third volume. That volume treated confrontation as an incident
of trial by jury.47 In Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec in 1774, the Continental
Congress included in the list of rights they had been denied:
The next great right is that of trial by jury. This provides, that
neither life, liberty, nor property, can be taken from the possessor, until
twelve of his unexceptionable countrymen and peers of his vicinage, who
from that neighbourhood may reasonably be supposed to be acquainted
with his character, and the characters of the witnesses, upon a fair trial,
and full inquiry, face to face, in open court, before as many of the people
as chuse to attend, shall pass their sentence upon oath against him.
4
Passages such as this give new meaning to Jefferson's complaint in the
Declaration of Independence that the English government had been "depriving us,
in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury., 4 9
IV. THE SixTH AMENDMENT
When the colonies became independent states, they wrote their own
declarations of the rights they had demanded during the revolutionary struggle. In
46 Id. § 6345, at 561.
41 Id. § 6345, at 432.
41 Id. § 6345, at 561 (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 221 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971)).
49 Id. § 6345, at 558 (citing The Declaration of Independence, in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 252-53 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971)).
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May, 1776, in his room in Raleigh's Tavern, George Mason penned the draft of the
first confrontation clause. Included in the incidents of trial by jury was a right "to
be confronted with the Accusers or Witnesses"-later changed to "Accusers and
Witnesses."5 Jefferson also saw confrontation as an incident of trial by jury but his
draft provided that cases "shall be tried by a jury upon evidence given viva voce, in
open court."51
Seven other states put the right of confrontation into their constitutions but
only Delaware followed the Virginia model. North Carolina gave the accused the
right "to confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony." Pennsylvania,
Vermont and Maryland said "to be confronted with the witnesses" or "the
witnesses against him." Massachusetts and New Hampshire gave a right "to meet
the witnesses against him face to face." But nothing in the historical record
suggests that the drafters thought these different words described a different
right-or one limited to cross-examination.
As Justice Scalia notes in his Crawford opinion, the opponents of the
Constitution made much of the drafters' failure to include a bill of rights that
spelled out the incidents of trial by jury in criminal cases-such as the right of
confrontation.52 When Madison sat down to redeem the Federalist promise of
amendments to cure this defect, he had more than 200 amendments proposed by
state ratifying conventions to sift through-including several different forms of a
confrontation clause. Madison copied the language from a New York proposal:
"to be confronted with his accusers and the witnesses against him."53 In addition,
he would have amended the jury trial provision in Article III to include vicinage,
unanimity, "and other accustomed requisites.
54
When the House referred Madison's draft to a select committee that included
Madison and representatives of each of the other states, that body changed the
confrontation provision to its present form; that is, it dropped the reference to
accusers so the clause read "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." But
nothing in the legislative history suggests that the committee intended to alter the
meaning of Madison's draft.55 When the House version went to the Senate, that
body objected to the vicinage provision but approved the Confrontation Clause as
written. However, a conference committee decided to take the provisions
50 Id. § 6346, at 580-81.
"' Id. at § 6346, at 581 (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTs: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 243 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971)).
52 The Scalia opinion contains two quotations showing that the opponents viewed
confrontation as simply one of several incidents of jury trials not spelled out in the proposed
Constitution, one of which links confrontation to trial in the vicinage. Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 48-49 (2004). But the majority still treats confrontation as a simple right to cross-examine.
53 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 6347, at 760-61.
54 Id. § 6347, at 762.
" Id. § 6347, at 764.
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governing jury trial, including the right of confrontation, out of the body of the
Constitution and combine them in a separate amendment.56
V. SUMMING UP
Even this brief sampling of the evidence available in the historical record
should suffice to show the flaws in the conventional history. First, the right of
confrontation is an American innovation, not an import from England. Second, the
Founders wanted a right to confront not only the "witnesses" who appeared at trial
but the "accusers" who lurked in the shadows. Finally, to "confront" an accuser
meant more than cross-examination but a right to a trial of the accusation by
procedures that were adversarial rather than inquisitorial. In short, the Sixth
Amendment amounts to more than a bundle of disparate rights; it incorporates a
holistic vision of a fair trial.
However, history does not provide clear answers to most contemporary
confrontation questions. The consistent distinction drawn between "accusers" and
"witnesses" strongly suggests that the drafters of the Confrontation Clause meant
to provide a right to confront not only the witnesses called by the prosecution but
also hearsay declarants. But because the hearsay rule was ill-defined in the late
18th Century, history cannot tell us whether the Founders would have approved a
dual system of confrontation that treated "accusers" and "witnesses" differently.
Instead of providing answers, all history can provide is some guidance in
asking the right questions. Rather than trying to decide whether a person making a
911 call is more like Lord Cobham or "the Portuguese gentleman, 57 courts and
writers need to think about the modem meaning of an accusatorial system of
criminal justice incorporating the values that moved the Founders in drafting the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. For example, some states now allow the
prosecution to use hearsay reports of the results of DNA analysis rather than
calling the person from the crime lab who ran the test. History cannot tell us
whether the Founders intended to allow confrontation of chemists, but it provides
fruitful analogies that enrich our analysis. Given the way in which the hatred of
the theologians who provided the doctrinal basis for heresy prosecutions became
transformed into colonial objections to customs informers, we can justly suppose
that the Founders would treat the person who says "the DNA we found on the
victim came from the defendant" as an "accuser" who must confront the defendant
with that opinion.
But we must still ask what it means to "confront" the chemist. Is it enough
that the chemist appears at the preliminary hearing and could have been cross-
examined? Since modem criminal pleadings do not provide the detail of a
common law indictment, does the Fifth Amendment suggest that confrontation at
56 Id. § 6347, at 766.
57 "The Portuguese gentlemen" was the declarant of a hearsay statement offered against
Raleigh. Id. § 6342, at 267-68.
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the preliminary hearing does not suffice unless the defense is provided with the
chemist's report prior to the preliminary hearing? Or does the analogy to the right
to counsel suggest that preliminary hearing confrontation suffices if the state
provides the defense with the funds and materials to run its own DNA testing prior
to trial? Given that courts have interpreted the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
allow the prosecution to commandeer the defendant's own DNA to accuse him of
the crime, doesn't this require a concomitant strengthening of the right of
confrontation to prevent prosecutorial abuse of these enhanced powers?
In short, history suggests that the Crawford court may finally be on the right
track, but it has a long way to go before confrontation becomes "the little engine
that could." A more sophisticated history is no "procedural guarantee of
trustworthiness," but it might provide more help than "Sir Walter Raleigh on the
Mayflower."

